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I
Since we wish to interpret "A -*B"6 as "A entails B," or "B is deducible from A," we clearly want to be able to assert A-*B whenever there exists a deduction of B from A; i.e., we will want a rule of "Entailment Introduction" (hereafter "HI") having the property that if A hypothesis (hereafter "hyp")
is a valid deduction of B from A, then AR-B shall follow from that deduction. Moreover, the fact that such a deduction exists, or correspondingly that an entailment A-RB holds, warrants the inference of B from A. That is, we expect also that an Elimination Rule (henceforth "-Y-E") will obtain for -*, in the sense that whenever A-RB is asserted, we shall be entitled to infer B from A.
So This rule leads immediately to the following theorem, the law of identity:7 6 We are taking entailment to be a relation between propositions, rather than sentences or statements, and with this understanding we will in the future observe a distinction between use and mention only where it seems essential. 7 AL--A represents the archetypal form of inference, the trivial foundation of all reasoning, in spite of those who would call it "merely a case of stuttering." Strawson (1952, p. 15) says that a man who repeats himself does not reason. But it is inconsistent to assert and deny the same thing. So a logician will say that a statement has to itself the relationship [entailment] he is interested in. Strawson has got the cart before the horse: we hold that the reason A and X are inconsistent is precisely because A follows from itself, rather than conversely. Note But obviously more is required if a theory of entailment is to be developed, and we therefore consider initially a device contained in the variant of natural deduction due to Fitch 1952, which allows us to construct within proofs of entailment, further proofs of entailment called "subordinate proofs," or "subproofs." In the course of a deduction, under the supposition that A (say), we may begin a new deduction, with a new hypothesis:
The new subproof is to be conceived of as an "item" of the proof of which A is the hypothesis, entirely on a par with A and any other propositions occurring in that proof. And the subproof of which B is hypothesis might itself have a consequence (by -*I) occurring in the proof of which A is the hypothesis. We next ask whether or not the hypothesis A holds also under the assumption B. In the system of Fitch 1952, the rules are so arranged that (for example) the hypothesis A may also be repeated under the assumption that B, such a repetition being called a "reiteration" to distinguish it from repetitions within the same proof or subproof: The proof method also has the advantage, in common with other systems of natural deduction, of motivating proofs: in order to prove A-*B, (perhaps under some hypothesis or hypotheses) we follow the simple and obvious strategy of playing both ends against the middle: breaking up the conclusion to be proved, and setting up subproofs by hyp until we find one with a variable as last step. Only then do we begin applying reit, rep, and -*E. Our description of HI* has been somewhat informal, and for the purpose of checking proofs it would be desirable to have a more rigorous formulation. We think of the following as designed primarily for testing rather than constructing proofs (though of course the distinction is heuristic rather than logical), and we therefore call this the Test Formulation of Fitch's system.
In order to motivate the Test Formulation, we notice that with each i-th step Ai in the proofs above there is associated first a number of vertical lines to the left of Ai (which we shall call the rank of As), secondly a class of formulas (including Ai) which are candidates for application of the rule of repetition to yield a next step for the proof, thirdly a class of candidates for application of the rule of reiteration, to yield the next step, and fourthly a hypothesis (if the proof has one) which may together with the final step of the deduction furnish an entailment as next step, as a consequence of the deduction. Accordingly we define a proof as consisting of a sequence Al, . . ., An of wffs, not necessarily distinct, for each Ai of which is defined a rank R(Ai), a class of repeatable wI/s Rep(Ai), a class of reiteratable wi/s Reit(Ai), and (if R(Ai) > 0) an immediate hypothesis H(Aj). These are all defined by simultaneous induction as follows:
On the contrary, Ackermann 1956 is surely right that "unter der Voraussetzung A-RB ist der Schluss von B-LC auf A-RC logisch zwingend." The mathematician is involved in no ellipsis in arguing that "if the lemma is deducible from the axioms, then this entails that the deducibility of the theorem from the axioms is entailed by the deducibility of the theorem from the lemma." Basis:
(a) Al is any wff. The foregoing formulation makes explicit the techniques involved in constructing subproofs, and similar formulations may be found for other systems to be considered subsequently. But making the procedure explicit leads to some loss as regards intuitive naturalness and obviousness, and we shall in the sequel continue to use the rather less formal approach with which we began, relying on the reader to see that the whole matter could be discussed more rigorously, along the lines just indicated.
As a further simplification we allow reiterations directly into subsubproofs, etc., with the understanding that a complete proof requires that reiterations be performed always from one proof into another proof immediately subordinate to it. As an example (step 6 below), we prove the self-distributive law (HI2, below): To see that the subproof formulation HI* contains the axiomatic formulation HI, we deduce the axioms of HI in HI* (HI2 was just proved and H1I is proved on p. 28 below) and then observe that the only rule of HI is also a rule of HI*. It follows that HI* contains HI.
To see that the axiomatic system HII contains the subproof formulation HI*, we first introduce the notion of a quasi-proof in HI*; a quasi-proof differs from a proof only in that we may introduce axioms or theorems of HI as steps (and of course use these, and steps derived from them, as premisses for rep, reit, or -WE). Clearly this does not increase the stock of theorems of HI*, since we may think of a step A, inserted under this rule, as coming by reiteration from a previous proof of A in HI* (which we know exists since HI* contains HI).
Our object then is to show how subproofs in a quasi-proof in HI* may be systematically eliminated in favor of theorems of HI and uses of -WE, in such a way that we are ultimately left with a sequence of formulas all of which are theorems of HI. This reduction procedure always begins with an innermost subproof, by which we mean a subproof Q which has no proofs subordinate to it. Let Q be an innermost subproof of a quasi-proof P of HI*, where the steps of Q are Al, . . ., A,, let Q' be the sequence Al-*Al, Al*A2, . . ., Al-*An, and let P' be the result of replacing the subproof Q of P by the sequence Q' of wffs. Our task is now to show that P' is a quasiproof, by showing how to insert theorems of HI among the wffs of Q', in such a way that each step of Q' may be justified by reit, rep, or --E. Thus far the theorems proved by the subordinate proof method have all seemed natural and obvious truths about our intuitive idea of entailment. But here we come upon a theorem which shocks our intuitions (at least our untutored intuitions), for the theorem seems to say that anything whatever has A as a logical consequence, provided only that A is true.
To be sure, there is an interpretations we could place on the arrow which would make A--.B-*A true, but if the formal machinery is offered as an analysis or reconstruction of the notion of entailment, or formal deducibility, the principle seems outrageous, -such at least is almost certain to be the initial reaction to the theorem, as anyone who has taught elementary logic very well knows. Such theorems as A-+.B-?A and A-*.B-?B are of course familiar, and much discussed under the heading of "implicational paradoxes." The commonest attitude among logicians (as was remarked at the outset) is simply to accept the paradoxes as in some sense true, and at the same time to recognize that the formalism doesn't quite capture our intuitive use of "if ... then -" (such in fact being our own attitude until the late fall of 1958). In what follows we will try to analyze the sources of the discomfort occasioned by such "implicational" paradoxes, and in the course of the argument offer reasons for believing that HI simply doesn't capture a notion of implication or entailment at all, or at least no more than (say) an equivalence relation captures the notion of "if ... then ." True, equivalence relations and entailment are both transitive and reflexive, but this similarity is not sufficient to enable us to identify entailment with any equivalence relation, since entailment is not symmetrical, and to say so is to make a false statement. Likewise, entailment and the connective of HI are both transitive and reflexive, but again this similarity is not sufficient to enable us to identify implication or entailment with the arrow of HI, since in HI one can prove A-*.B--*A, which is false of entailment and its converse, formal deducibility. Such a view is of course heterodox in logical circles, and will be rejected by many. Curry 1959, for example, has argued (in four closely-reasoned pages) that A-*.B-*A, "far from being paradoxical," is, 10 Myhill 1953 has shown that in HI A-RB is interdeducible with (3r)(rA((YAA)-3B)), under plausible assumptions about strict implication. In a forthcoming paper, Belnap proves that in the system E of Anderson and Belnap 1958, with propositional quantifiers added, intuitionistic implication A D B may be defined as (3r) (rA ((rAA) -*B)), and intuitionistic negation -,A as A D (p)p. Some may therefore wish to regard intuitionistic implication as a kind of enthymematic implication, as when we say that it "follows" from the assertion that Socrates is a man, that he is also mortal. But this is not a relation of deducibility or entailment; the latter holds only when all required premisses are stated explicitly in the antecedent. We agree (in spirit) with the classical position regarding enthymemes, as stated e.g. by Joseph 1925: An enthymeme indeed is not a particular form of argument, but a particular way of stating an argument. The name is given to a syllogism with one premiss -or, it may be, the conclusion suppressed. Nearly all syllogisms are, as a matter of fact, stated as enthymemes, except in the examples of a logical treatise, or the conduct of a formal disputation. It must not be supposed, however, that we are the less arguing in syllogism, because we use one member of the argument without its being explicitly stated. We note in passing that the principle of exportation has the effect of confusing valid arguments with enthymemes. for any proper implication, "a platitude." A "proper" implication is definedby Curry as any implication which has the following properties: there is a proof of B from the hypotheses Al, . . ., A,-,, An (in the Official sense of "proof from hypotheses") if and only if there is a proof of AH-AB from the hypotheses Al, ..., Aj.
On these grounds A-*.B-?A is indeed a platitude: there is surely a proof of A from the hypotheses A, B; and hence for any "proper" implication, a proof of B-RA from the hypothesis A; and hence a proof without hypotheses of A-+.B-A.ll Curry goes on to dub the implicational relation of HI "absolute implication" on the grounds that HI is the minimal system having this property. But we notice at once that HI is "absolute" only relatively, i.e., relatively to the Official definition of "proof from hypotheses." From this point of view, our remarks to follow may be construed as arguing the impropriety of accepting the Official definition of "proof from hypotheses," as a basis for defining a "proper implication"; as we shall claim, the Official view captures neither "proof" (a matter involving logical necessity), nor "from" (a matter requiring relevance). But even those with intuitions so sophisticated that A-+.B--*A seems tolerable might still find some interest in an attempt to analyze our initial feelings of repugnance in its presence.
Why does A-+.B--+A seem so queer? We believe that its oddness is due to two isolable features of the principle, which we consider forthwith.
II

Necessity.
For more than two millenia logicians have taught that logic is a formal matter, and that the validity of an inference depends not on material considerations, but on formal considerations alone. The companion view that the validity of a valid inference is no accident of nature, but rather a property a valid inference has necessarily, has had an equally illustrious history. But both of these conditions are violated if we take the arrow of HI to express implication. For if A is contingent, then A-+.B-?A says that an entailment B--A follows from or is deducible from a contingent proposition -in defiance of the condition that formal considerations alone validate valid inferences. And if A should be a true contingent proposition, then B-?A is also contingently true, and an entailment is established as holding because of an accident of nature.
It has been said in defence of A-?.B--+A as an entailment that at least it is "safe," in the sense that if A is true, then it is always safe to infer A 11 Curry calls this a proof of A->..B--A "from nothing." We remark that this expression invites the interpretation "there is nothing from which A -*.B--A is deducible," in which case we would seem to have done little toward showing that it is true. But of course Curry is not confused on this point; he means that A-?.B-+A is deducible "from" the null set of premisses -in the reason-shattering, Official sense of "from." from an arbitrary B, since we run no risk of uttering a falsehood in doing so; this thought ("Safety First") seems to be behind attempts, in a number of elementary logic texts, to justify the claim that A-%.B---A has something to do with implication. In reply we of course admit that if A is true then it is "safe" to say so (i.e., A--A). But saying that A is true on the irrelevant assumption that B, is not to deduce A from B, nor to establish that B implies A, in any sensible sense of "implies." Of course we can say "Assume that snow is puce. Seven is a prime number." But if we say "Assume that snow is puce. It follows that (or consequently, or therefore, or it may validly be inferred that) seven is a prime number," then we have simply spoken falsely. A man who assumes the continuum hypothesis, and then remarks that it is a nice day, is not inferring the latter from the former, -even if he keeps his supposition fixed firmly in mind while noting the weather. And since a (true) A does not follow from an (arbitrary) B, we reject A->.B-->A as expressing a truth of entailment or implication, a rejection which is in line with the view (often expressed even by those who hold that A-%.B-*A expresses a fact about implication or entailment or "if ... then -") that entailments, if true at all, are necessarily true.
How can we modify the formulation of HI in such a way as to guarantee that the logical truths expressible in it shall be necessary, rather than contingent? As a start, we might reflect that in our usual mathematical or logical proofs, we demand that all the conditions required for the conclusion be stated in the hypothesis of a theorem. After the word "Proof:" in a mathematical treatise, mathematical writers seem to feel that no more hypotheses may be introduced -and it is regarded as a criticism of a proof if not all the required hypotheses are stated explicitly at the outset. Of course additional machinery may be invoked in the proof, but this must be of a logical character, i.e., in addition to the hypotheses, we may use only logically necessary propositions in the argument. These considerations suggest that we should be allowed to import into a deduction (i.e., into a subproof by reit) only propositions which, if true at all, are necessarily true: i.e., we should reiterate only entailments. And indeed such a restriction on reiteration would immediately rule out A->.B-->A as a theorem, while countenancing all the other theorems we have proved thus far. We call the system with reiteration so restricted S41*, and proceed to prove it equivalent to the following axiomatic formulation, which we call S41, since it is the pure strict "implicational" fragment of Lewis's S4.12 S4I1. A-*A S4I2. (A-+.B-*C) -.A-?B-+.A-? Finally, the step Al-*A,, regarded as a consequence of Q in P, may now be regarded as a repetition of the final step Al -An of Q' in P'.
Hence P' is a quasi-proof. And repeated application of this technique to P' eventually leads to a sequence P" of wffs, each of which is a theorem of S41. Hence S41 includes S41*, and the two are equivalent.
A deduction theorem of the more usual sort is provable also for S41: The restriction on reiteration then suffices to remove one objectionable feature of HI, since it is now no longer possible to establish an entailment B-*A on the (perhaps contingent) ground that A is simply true. But of course it is well known that the "implication" relation of S4 is also paradoxical, since we can easily establish that an arbitrary irrelevant proposition B "implies" A, provided A is a necessary truth. A-*A is necessarily true, and from it and S4,3 follows B-*.A--A, where B may be totally irrelevant to A-*A. This defect leads us to consider an alternative restriction on HI, designed to exclude such fallacies of relevance.
III
Relevance.
For more than two millenia logicians have taught that a necessary condition for the validity of an inference from A to B is that A be relevant to B. Virtually every logic book up to the present century has a chapter on fallacies of relevance, and many contemporary elementary texts have followed the same plan. (Notice that contemporary writers, in the later and more formal chapters of their books, seem explicitly to contradict the earlier chapters, when they try desperately to con the students into accepting material or strict "implication" as a "kind" of implication relation, in spite of the fact that these relations countenance fallacies of relevance.) But the denial that relevance is essential to a valid argument (a denial which is implicit in the view that strict "implication" is an implication relation) seems to us flatly in error.
Imagine, if you can, a situation as follows. A mathematician writes a paper on Banach spaces, and after proving a couple of theorems he concludes with a conjecture. As a footnote to the conjecture, he writes: "In addition to its intrinsic interest, this conjecture has connections with other parts of mathematics which might not immediately occur to the reader. For example, if the conjecture is true, then the first order functional calculus is complete; whereas if it is false, then it implies that Fermat's last conjecture is correct." The editor replies that the paper is obviously acceptable, but he finds the final footnote perplexing; he can see no connection whatever between the conjecture and the "other parts of mathematics," and none is indicated in the footnote. So the mathematician replies, "Well, I was using 'if ... then -' and 'implies' in the way that logicians have claimed I was: the first order functional calculus is complete, and necessarily so, so anything implies that fact -and if the conjecture is false it is presumably impossible, and hence implies anything. And if you object to this usage, it is simply because you have not understood the technical sense of 'if ... then -' worked out so nicely for us by logicians." And to this the editor counters: "I understand the technical bit all right, but it is simply not correct. In spite of what most logicians say about us, the standards maintained by this journal require that the antecedent of an 'if ... then -' statement must be relevant to the conclusion drawn. And you have given no evidence that your conjecture about Banach spaces is relevant either to the completeness theorem or to Fermat's conjecture."
The editor's point is of course that though the technical meaning is clear, it is simply not the same as the meaning ascribed to "if ... then " in the pages of his journal (nor, we suspect, in the pages of this JOURNAL). Furthermore, he has put his finger precisely on the difficulty: to argue from the necessary truth of A to if B then A is simply to commit a fallacy of relevance. The fancy that relevance is irrelevant to validity strikes us as ludicrous, and we therefore make an attempt to explicate the notion of relevance of A to B.
For this we return to the notion of proof from hypotheses, the leading idea being that we want to infer A-HB from "a proof of B from the hypothesis A." As we pointed out before, in the usual axiomatic formulations of propositional calculi the matter is handled as follows. We say that In this example we indeed proved A--A, but it is crashingly obvious that we did not prove it from the hypothesis B: the defect lies in the definition, which fails to take seriously the word "from" in "proof from hypotheses." And this fact suggests a solution to the problem: we should devise a technique for keeping track of the steps used, and then allow application of the introduction rule only when A is relevant to B in the sense that A is used in arriving at B. As a start in this direction, we suggest prefixing a star (say) to the hypothesis of a deduction, and also to the conclusion of an application of -+E just in case at least one premiss has a star, steps introduced as axioms being unstarred. Restriction of -I to cases where in accordance with these rules both A and B are starred would then exclude theorems of the form A--*B, where B is proved independently of A.
In other words, what is wanted is a system for which there is provable a deduction theorem, to the effect that there exists a proof of B from the hypothesis A if and only if A-*B is provable. And we now consider the question of choosing axioms in such a way as to guarantee this result. In view of the rule -*E, the implication in one direction is trivial; we consider the converse. (1) Neither premiss is starred. Then in the axiomatic proof, Ai, Ai-*A1, and A} all remain unaltered, so -HE may be used as before.
(2) The minor premiss is starred and the major one is not. Then in the axiomatic proof we have Al->Ai and Ai-*-A1; so we need to be able to infer A1--.Aj from these (since the star on Ai guarantees a star on A} in the original proof).
(3) The major premiss is starred and the minor one is not. Then in the axiomatic proof we have Al-+.Ai -A1 and Ai, so we need to be able to infer Al-+A1 from these. But in the former case, we would not expect to require that all the Ai be relevant to B. We shall give reasons presently, deriving from another formulation of WI, for thinking it sensible to require each of the Ai in the nested implication to be relevant to B; a feature of the situation which will lead us to make a sharp distinction between (AlA... AA,,) -B and A1--.. AnB.
(It is presumably the failure to make this distinction which leads Curry 1959 to say of the relation considered in Church's theorem that it is one "which is not ordinarily considered in deductive methodology at all.") We feel that the star formulation of the deduction theorem makes clearer what is at stake in Church's calculus. On the other hand Church's own deduction theorem has the merit of allowing for proof of nested entailments in a more perspicuous way than is available in the star formulation. Our next task therefore is to try to combine these approaches so as to obtain the advantages of both.
Returning now to a consideration of subordinate proofs, it seems natural to try to extend the star treatment, using some other symbol for deductions carried out in a subproof, but retaining the same rules for carrying this symbol along. We might consider a proof of contraction in which the inner hypothesis is distinguished by a dagger rather than a star: To see that this generalization WI* is also equivalent to WI, observe first that the axioms of WI are easily proved in WI*; hence WI* contains WI. The proof of the converse involves little more than repeated application, beginning with innermost subproofs, of the techniques used in proving the deduction theorem for WI; it will be left to the reader.
(We remark that a Test Formulation of WI arises if to the formulation for HI we add the following clauses defining a set of "relevance indices" Rel(Ai) for each i-th step. If the subscripting device is taken as an explication of relevance, then it is seen that Church's WI does secure relevance, since A-+B is provable in WI only if A is relevant to B.
But if WI is taken as an explication of entailment, then the requirement of necessity for a valid inference is lost. Consider the following special case of the law of assertion, just proved:
A-+.A-?A-*A.
This says that if A is true, then it follows from A-*A. But it seems reasonable to suppose that any logical consequence of A--A should be necessarily true. (Note that in the familiar systems of modal logic, consequences of necessary truths are necessary.) We certainly do in practice recognize that there are truths which do not follow from a law of logic -but WI obliterates this distinction. It seems evident, therefore, that a satisfactory theory of implication will require both relevance (like WI) and necessity (like S4I). IV Necessity and relevance. We therefore consider the system E114 which arises when we recognize that valid inferences require both necessity and relevance. Since the restrictions are most transparent as applied to the subproof format, we begin by considering the system El* which results from imposing the restriction on reiteration (of S41*) together with the subscript requirements (of W1*).15 We summarize the rules of EI* as follows:
(1) Hyp. A step may be introduced as the hypothesis of a new subproof, and each new hypothesis receives a unit class {k} of numerical subscripts, where k is the rank of A.
(2) Rep. Aa may be repeated, retaining the relevance indices a. 15 E,* is not, however, the intersection of S4,* and WI*. We are indebted to Saul Kripke for a counter-example:
A .(A-*.A--B) -*.A--B is provable in both the latter systems, but not in E,*. 16 The present order of exposition was adopted for reasons connected with the philosophical points to be made, but it should not be allowed to obscure the extent of our considerable indebtedness to this paper of Ackermann.
Ackermann's system to Church's. Moreover, rule (6) requires the restriction (as Ackermann 1956 points out) that the minor premiss A be a theorem, else one could pass from a contingently true A, by way of A-*A-*.A-?A, to A-LA-CA, thus again obliterating the distinction between necessary and contingent truth. (6) is therefore non-normal, in the sense that no corresponding entailment is provable. This situation may be remedied, however, if we replace (6) by the following axiom Ei5. A-*A-*B-*B, which yields an equivalent set of theorems, as we now see. Let E1' be EI1-4, -+E and (6), and let EJ" be EJ1-5 and -*E. EJ5 is immediate in E1', from E1l and AAB.AAB by (6); hence E,' contains EJ'. To prove (6) in E," we assume the first two steps below obtained, and proceed as indicated (after noting that in the pure implicational calculus the minor premiss of (6) To complete the proof we observe that the restriction on the introduction rule guarantees that k is in a., hence the final step Ana.' of Q' is (Al*Afl)a"-{k}. But then the conclusion (Ai l>An)a,._{k} from Q by -*I in P can be regarded in P' as a repetition of the last wff of Q'. Though "snow is white" and "that snow is white entails that snow is white" are both true -the latter necessarily so -it seems implausible that "snow is white" should entail that it entails itself. It does entail itself, of course, but the color of snow seems irrelevant to that fact of logic. We would think someone arguing rather badly if he tried to convince us that snow is white entails itself by showing us some snow.
Also ruled out as involving fallacies of modality are such formulas as the unrestricted "law" of assertion: The latter is of special interest in connection with our proposed definition of necessity. There are six fairly well known pure "implicational" calculi in the literature, three of which make modal distinctions (El, S41, and S5I), and three of which do not (WI, HI, and PI, the "implicational" fragment of the two-valued calculus). Consider the following set of schemata. In arguing that El satisfies a principle of relevance, we venture, somewhat gingerly, on new ground. We offer two conditions, the first as necessary and sufficient, the second as necessary only.
1. The subscripting technique as applied in WI and EJ may be construed as a formal analysis of the intuitive idea that for A to be relevant to B it must be possible to use A in a deduction of B from A. It need not be necessary to use A in the deduction of B from A -and indeed this is a familiar situation in mathematics and logic. It not infrequently happens that the hypotheses of a theorem, though all relevant to a conclusion, are subsequently found to be unnecessarily strong. An example is provided by Gbdel's original incompleteness theorem, which required the assumption of c-consistency. Rosser subsequently showed that this condition was not required for the proof of incompleteness -but surely no one would hold that c-consistency was irrelevant to Gbdel's result. Similarly in the following example (due to Smiley 1959), effort is wasted, since the antecedent is used in the proof of the consequent, though it need not be. 
